


**BEHAVIORAL THREAT
ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT:
KEY PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES
FOR PREVENTING TARGETED VIOLENCE**

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- Lead Author:
 - *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment & Management Teams (2008)*


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ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

Domains of knowledge and experience:


- Mental illness;
- Complex patterns of behavior;
- Dynamics of aggression and violence;
- Stalking and predation;
- Threatening communications;
- Bystander intervention;
- Interviewing;
- Detection of deception;
- De-escalation of hostile and acutely violent subjects;
- Mental health social service systems;

Source: Nicoletti, Allen, Baum, Deisinger, et al. (2011). Police Psychologists, *The Police Chief*, August, 2011.



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**FOUNDATIONS OF
PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
& THREAT ASSESSMENT**



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RISK FACTORS FOR WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

Personal Factors

- History of drug or alcohol abuse
- Past conflicts or violence with coworkers
- Past convictions for violent crimes
- Increasing belligerence or hypersensitivity to criticism
- Homicidal/suicidal comments or threats
- Specific & direct threats
- Recent acquisition/fascination with weapons
- Obsession with a grievance
- Preoccupation with violent themes
- Interest in recently publicized violent events
- Outbursts of anger
- Extreme disorganization
- Noticeable changes in behavior

Source: *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. (2004) U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation




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RISK FACTORS FOR WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

Workplace Factors

- Understaffing leading to job overload or compulsory overtime
- Frustrations from poorly defined job tasks and responsibilities
- Downsizing or reorganization
- Labor disputes and poor labor-management relations
- Poor management styles (e.g., arbitrary or unexplained orders)
- Corrections or reprimands in front of other employees
- Inconsistent discipline).
- Inadequate security
- A lack of employee counseling
- A high injury rate
- Frequent grievances

Source: *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. (2004) U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation



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EXCEPTIONAL CASE STUDY PROJECT

Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1997) *Preventing Assassination: A Monograph. Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project.*

Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1997) *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials.*

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EXCEPTIONAL CASE STUDY PROJECT

Key Findings:

- Assassination is the end result of a discernible and understandable process of thinking and behavior
- Attackers and near-lethal approachers do not fit any reliable descriptive or demographic profiles
- Attackers and near-lethal approachers often demonstrated “attack-related” behaviors
- Mental illness only rarely plays a key role in assassination behaviors.
- Persons who pose an actual threat often do not make threats, especially direct threats.

Source: Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1997) *Preventing Assassination: A Monograph. Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project.*

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RESEARCH ON SCHOOL ATTACKS

1. School-based attacks are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.

Source: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, *Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of Targeted School Violence in the U.S.* (2002).

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PATHWAY TO VIOLENCE

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RESEARCH ON SCHOOL ATTACKS

2. Prior to the attacks, others usually knew of attacker’s idea/plan.
 - Most (over 75%) discuss their plans with others before the attack.
3. Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to the attack.
4. There is no accurate or useful profile of the “school shooter.”

Source: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, *Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of Targeted School Violence in the U.S.* (2002).

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RESEARCH ON SCHOOL ATTACKS

5. Most attackers had seriously concerned others in their lives prior to the attack.
6. Many felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
7. Most attackers had significant difficulties with losses or failures. Most were suicidal.

Source: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, *Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of Targeted School Violence in the U.S.* (2002).

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RESEARCH ON SCHOOL ATTACKS

8. Most attackers had access to weapons – and has used weapons -- prior to the attack.
9. In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
10. Despite prompt law enforcement response, most incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
11. Most were very brief in duration.

Source: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, *Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of Targeted School Violence in the U.S.* (2002).



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IMPLICATIONS

- Many targeted attacks can be prevented.
- Information about a subject’s ideas and plans for violence can be observed or discovered before harm can occur.
- Information available is likely to be scattered and fragmented.
- Key is to act quickly upon an initial report of concern, see who else has a piece of the puzzle, then pull all the information together to see what picture emerges.

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WARNING BEHAVIORS (PROXIMAL)

- Pathway (actions)
- Fixation
- Identification
- Novel Aggression
- Energy Burst
- Leakage
- Directly Communicated Threat
- Last Resort Behaviors

Source:
Meloy & Hoffman

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TARGETED VIOLENCE

Targeted Violence: “Incident of violence where a known or knowable assailant chooses a particular target(s) prior to a violent attack.”

Typically involves:

- Grievance
- Expression of grievance and use of violence
- Research & Planning
- Preparation
- Implementation

Source: FBI (2017). Making Prevention of Violence a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks

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TARGETED VIOLENCE

Examples of Targeted violence:

- Grievance-based violence
 - Workplace
 - Schools & Campuses
 - Houses of Worship / Faith communities
 - Government agencies
 - Public figures / law enforcement officers
- Suicide in public location
- Stalking
- Domestic / Intimate partner violence
- Public mass violence
- Lone actor Terrorism / Violent extremism
- Insider Threat

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INSIDER THREATS

- Espionage / Counter-Intelligence
- Theft
 - Material
 - Intellectual property
- Disruption / Sabotage
- Suicide in Workplace
- Targeted violence
 - Grievance-based violence
 - Stalking
 - Domestic / Dating violence
 - Mass violence
 - Terrorism / Violent extremism

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MODE OF VIOLENCE: AFFECTIVE

- Intense emotion and expressiveness;
- Violence is reactive and immediate;
- Violence against perceived threats;
- Heightened and diffuse awareness;
- Goal is threat reduction (homeostasis);
- Primarily emotional and defensive;
- Rapid displacement of target;
- Reactions are time limited;

Source: Meloy, *Violence Risk & Threat Assessment*

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MODE OF VIOLENCE: PREDATORY

- Minimal emotion or expression;
- Violence is planned and purposeful;
- Violence against specified targets;
- Heightened and focused awareness;
- Violence serves variable goals;
- Primarily cognitive and attack-oriented;
 - Often preceded by private ritual;
- Minimal displacement of target;
- Not time limited;

Source: Meloy, *Violence Risk & Threat Assessment*


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HAVING A TEAM IS NOT ENOUGH

Organizations must have a systematic process that:

- Utilizes effective & relevant multi-disciplinary approach, capable of addressing all threats;
- Enables centralized awareness of developing concerns through active outreach programs & consultations;
- Facilitates a thorough & contextual assessment;
- Implements proactive & integrated case management;
- Monitors & re-assesses case on a longitudinal basis;
- Conducts all practices in accordance with relevant laws, policies, and standards of practice;
- Adapts to challenges & changing needs.


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THREAT ASSESSMENT

A systematic process that is designed to:

- 1 • IDENTIFY situations/persons of concern
- 2 • INQUIRE & gather information
- 3 • ASSESS situation
- 4 • MANAGE the situation/mitigate risk


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MULTI-DISCIPLINARY BTAM PROCESS:

Goals:

- Increase awareness of developing concerns/threats
- Maximize skills and resources to address concerns
- Enhance ability to monitor outcomes
- Enhance:
 - Communication
 - Collaboration
 - Coordination
 - Capitalization

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MULTI-DISCIPLINARY BTAM PROCESS:

Multi-Disciplinary Involvement by:

- Law Enforcement & Analysts
- Command / Management
- Human Resources / Organizational Development
- Mental / Behavioral Health Professional
- Legal Counsel
- Threat Management Consultant *
- Independent Medical/Psychological Evaluator **

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PERPETRATOR AFFILIATION


Perpetrator Relation to Workplace

- Type 1: Unaffiliated (with other criminal intent)
- Type 2: Customer/Client
- Type 3: Employee
- Type 4: Personal Relationship

Source: University of Iowa Injury Prevention Research Center (2001).
Workplace Violence: A Report to the Nation.

- Type 5: Unaffiliated (without other criminal intent)

Source: G. Deisinger & M. Randazzo (2008).



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TARGETS

Targets can be:


- Persons
- Places
- Programs
- Processes
- Philosophies
- Proxies

Chosen based on:

- Desirability
- Vulnerability
- Availability

Source: FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit

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FACILITATE ENGAGEMENT


For effective bystander intervention & engagement, people need to know:

- Their role and responsibility
 - GOAL: Consult and engage about concerns
- What to consult about
- Where (and with whom) to consult
- Consultations are wanted
- Something will be done
- Regular reminders of issues and process




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CENTRALIZED REPORTING & TRIAGE



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WHAT TO CONSULT ABOUT / REPORT?

- Communicated threats of violence
- Threatening behavior(s)
- Unusual or significantly disruptive behavior
- Unusual correspondence or communications
- Stalking
- Domestic /dating violence
- Harassment, bullying, intimidation
- Concerns for well-being of others
 - Major life stressors
 - Acute mental illness
 - Suicidality



BUILDING AWARENESS

Outreach/Awareness presentations


- Managers, supervisors, employees
- Contractors

Training Sessions

- Consulting & case management process;
- Verbal de-escalation
- Incident survival


Information: Available and sustained

- Website
- E-mail updates/newsletters
- Social media



RECORD KEEPING

- Centralized incident tracking database
- Document reports and actions - include date, time, subjects, targets, behaviors of concern, witnesses
 - Data
 - Assessment
 - Plan
- Preserve evidence: Keep copies of email, memos, etc.

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THREAT ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES

Targeted Violence is the product of an interaction among multiple domains:

- S** The **subject** who may take violent action;
- T** Vulnerabilities of the **target** of such actions;
- E** An **environment** that facilitates or permits violence, or does not discourage it; and,
- P** **Precipitating events** that may trigger change.

Source: G. Deisinger & M. Randazzo


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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

What are the subject's grievance(s) & goal(s)?

- What first brought subject to someone's attention?
- What are the major or unresolved grievances?
- Who/what is the focus of the grievance?
- **Fixation** on grievance, target, or need for resolution?
- What efforts have been made to resolve the problem and what has been the result?
- Does the subject feel that any part of the problem is resolved or see any alternatives?
- Is subject running out of options?

Adapted from: U.S. Secret Service, *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials* (2000) & Meloy, et al. *Warning Behaviors*.

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PRECIPITANTS OF TARGETED VIOLENCE

Sources of Grievances:	Motivations:
▪ Personal	▪ Justice
▪ Political	▪ Revenge
▪ Religious	▪ Notoriety / Recognition
▪ Racial/Ethnic	▪ Despair/Desperation
▪ Environmental	▪ Death
▪ Special Interest	▪ Martyrdom

Source: FBI (2017). *Making Prevention of Violence a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks*

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Have there been communications indicating ideation, planning, or preparation, for violence or disruption?

- Are there **Direct threats** of violence/harm?
- Is there **Leakage**?
- Ideation for use of violence in response to grievance?
- What means/modes communication have been used?
- Who are communications directed to?
- What is relationship between subject and target?
- Has anyone been alerted or "warned away"?

Adapted from: U.S. Secret Service, *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials* (2000) & Meloy, et al. *Warning Behaviors*.

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UNUSUAL/THREATENING COMMUNICATION

- Leakage of grievance, ideation, plans, preparation
- Pattern indicating escalation pertinent to grievance
- **Intensity of Effort**, indicated by:
 - Frequency of contact
 - Duration of contact
 - Multiple means of contact
 - Target dispersion
- **Intensity of Focus** upon a specific target / grievance
- Pathway behaviors
 - Intent or justification for violence
 - Planning or preparation
 - Diminishing alternatives

Scalora, M. (2013) *International Handbook of Threat Assessment*


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KEY POINTS ABOUT VIOLENCE

Dangerousness is not a permanent state of being nor solely an attribute of a person.

Dangerousness is **situational** & based on:

- J**ustification;
- A**lternatives;
- C**onsequences; and
- A**bility.



Source: Gavin de Becker
The Gift of Fear

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Has subject demonstrated Identification and/or inappropriate interest with other perpetrator's:

- Personal background/circumstances
 - Pseudocommando / Warrior / Agent of change
- Grievances
- Tactics / weapons
- Outcomes

Adapted from: U.S. Secret Service, *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials* (2000) & Meloy, et al. Warning Behaviors.

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Does the subject have (or are they developing) the capacity to engage in targeted violence?

- Are there Pathway Behaviors? Where on Pathway?
 - Planning
 - Preparation (Means, Method, Opportunity, Proximity)
- How organized is the subject's thinking and behavior?
- Are there changes in activity levels or Energy Bursts?
- History of violence or aspects of Novel Aggression?
- Is subject developing the perceived capability (skill & will)?

Adapted from: U.S. Secret Service, *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials* (2000) & Meloy, et al. Warning Behaviors.

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Is the subject experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?

- Has subject had recent / lasting loss, failure, or injustice?
- Is subject having significant difficulty coping?
- Are there indications of Last Resort behaviors?
 - Desperation / action imperative
 - Lack of perceived alternatives
 - Violence justified to address perceived grievance
 - Lack of concern / welcoming consequences
 - Development of legacy token
- Has subject conveyed intent to harm/kill self or others?

Adapted from: U.S. Secret Service, *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials* (2000) & Meloy, et al. Warning Behaviors.

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Has the subject's behavior indicated or raised concern of need for intervention or supportive services?

- Does subject have difficulty coping?
- Symptoms of severe, acute, untreated mental illness, e.g.:
 - Significant lack of contact with reality:
 - Hallucinations (especially command hallucinations)
 - Delusions (especially paranoid / persecutory or grandiosity)
 - Extreme wariness, distrust, paranoia
 - Symptoms that impact subject's perceptions of grievances or how others respond to subject?
 - Major Depression
 - Alcohol or other drug use/abuse?
- Subject have access to & actively engaged in treatment?

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Does the subject have a trusting & sustained relationship with at least one responsible person?

- Is subject emotionally connected to other people?
- Does subject have a friend, colleague, family member, or other person that they trust and can rely upon?
- Does that other person have skill and willingness to monitor, intervene, support subject?
- Is the relationship in jeopardy?


Adapted from: U.S. Secret Service, *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State & Local Law Enforcement Officials* (2000).

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Does the subject have traits, attitudes, resources, or skills that inhibit use of violence?


- Views violence as unacceptable
- Sustains trusted and valued relationships / support systems
- Accepts responsibility for actions
- Demonstrates remorse for inappropriate behavior
- Respects reasonable limits & expectations
- Uses socially sanctioned means of addressing grievances
- Values life, job, relationships, freedom
- Fears loss of reputation, job, freedom, life
- Maintains and uses effective coping skills
- Treatment compliance/engagement

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Are Targets (or others) indicating vulnerability or concern about the subject's potential for violence?


- Are those who know the subject concerned that he or she might take action based on violent ideas or plans?
- Are those who know the subject concerned about a specific target?
- Are targets or others around the subject engaging in protective actions (e.g. distancing, avoiding, minimizing conflict, etc.)
- Are targets engaging in behavior or in situations that increase their desirability, availability or vulnerability?
- Do targets have adequate coping and support resources?

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Are there Environmental/Systemic factors that are impacting the situation?


- Systemic, policy, or procedural problems
- Silos, gaps, or delays in reporting of concerns
- Poor conflict management skills
- Poor supervisory skills and/or willingness to address
- Organizational climate concerns: e.g., harassment, bullying
- Lack of support resources in community
- Social influences of others in environment
 - Actively discourage or encourage/dare use of violence?
 - Deny/minimize the possibility of violence?
 - Passively collude with act?

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Are there Precipitating Events that may impact the situation currently and in foreseeable future?


- Loss / Injustice
 - Job / income
 - Status
 - Relationship / support
 - Health
 - Community/Identity (Rejection / Ostracization);
- Key dates / events
 - Relational
 - Administrative action/order (Issuance, service, violation)
 - Court order (Issuance, service, violation)
- Opportunity (availability and vulnerability of target)
- Case Management Interventions

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MONITORING FOR OUTCOMES

Intervention Outcomes


- Improve situation.
- Worsen situation.
- No discernable change in situation.
- Create new concern/situation.

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KEY INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

What is the consistency and credibility of information about the situation?

- Are the subject's conversation and "story" consistent with his or her actions?
- Do collateral sources confirm or dispute what the subject says is going on and how they are dealing with it?
- Are there multiple sources?
- Do sources have direct and unique knowledge of subject and/or situation?
- Do any sources have ulterior motives?
- What gaps exist in understanding of the situation?

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DECISION-MAKING

Protecting Against Cognitive Bias

- Confirmation Bias
- Anchoring
- Over-Confidence
- In-group Bias
- Availability Bias
- Probability neglect
- Fundamental attribution error
- Hindsight Bias

Source: Daniel Kahneman (2013) Thinking Fast & Slow

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USING ASSESSMENT TOOLS

Systematize data collection and assessment:

- Spousal Risk Assessment Guide (SARA);
- Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG);
- Cawood / White Assessment Grid;
- MOSAIC;
- Classification of Violence Risk (COVR);
- Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk (WAVR-21).

Note: This is a partial listing of such instruments and not an endorsement of any particular approach.

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USING ASSESSMENT TOOLS


Appropriate use of instruments:

- Ensure that instrument is reliable and valid;
- Be aware of limitations of the instrument;
- Use for purpose for which it was designed.
- Stay current with new data and versions;
- Ensure evaluator is properly trained;
- Avoid reliance on instrument only;
- Integrate information with structured professional judgment.

Source: Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP).

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SOCIAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE



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INTEGRATED CASE MANAGEMENT

Effective case management integrates interventions across the (relevant) domains:

S De-escalate, contain, or control the **subject** who may take violent action;

T Decrease vulnerabilities of the **target**;

E Modify physical and cultural **environment** to discourage escalation; and,

P Prepare for & mitigate against **precipitating events** that may trigger adverse reactions.

Source: G. Deisinger & M. Randazzo

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CASE MANAGEMENT

Develop an individualized plan based on information gathered in the investigation and other facts known about the person.


- Plan must be fact-based and person-specific.
- Engagement can be critical, even when dealing with someone who is very angry.
- Distancing makes monitoring and intervention more difficult.
- Personalities matter.

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SUBJECT-BASED STRATEGIES

Implement appropriate strategies:


- Utilize less intrusive measures first;
 - Driven by effective case management vs. documentation & liability management.
- Maintain channel of communication and information gathering (with internal subject).
- Subject interview;
 - De-escalate, contain, or control subject.
- Subject referral for assistance;
- Subject confrontation or warning;
- Disciplinary actions;

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ENGAGEMENT

Utilize key relationships (with subject, target and witnesses) as channel of communication for:

- Information gathering and assessment;
- Redirect from violence / targets;
- Problem solving / support
- Set boundaries / limitations
- Admonishment / confrontation
- Intervention / referral
- Monitoring
- Deterrence


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SUBJECT CONTROL STRATEGIES

Leave, suspension, or termination options that focus solely on controlling the person do not address the long-term challenges of:

- Moving person away from thoughts & plans of, and capacity for, violence and/or disruption;
- Connecting person to resources (where needed);
- Mitigating organizational/systemic factors;
- Monitoring person when they are no longer connected to organization.

Use with intentionality, awareness of limitations, and anticipation of consequences.

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TARGET MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Coaching regarding personal safety approaches


- Clear limits and boundaries
- Monitor communications for changes / escalations
- Avoid contact / response
 - Document all contacts from/with subject
- Minimize reactivity to subject actions
- Minimize public information
- Maintain/enhance situational awareness
- Vary routine
- Develop contingency plans
 - Escape, shelter, defense
- Utilize support systems

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TARGET MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Organizational Roles in Reducing Target Vulnerability

- Engagement with Target
- Change work hours
- Change work location
- Change/enhance security in work location
- Notice to co-workers
- Security staffing
- Safety escorts
- Fear management
- EAP / Counseling referrals





REMEMBERING WHO WE SERVE

What targets/victims want:

- Care
- Certainty
- Consistency
- Communication

- Gavin de Becker
"The Gift of Fear"



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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

- Address systemic, policy, or procedural problems
- Identify/address reporting gaps/delays
- Intervene with associates that support violent behavior
- Enhance conflict management skills
- Enhance supervisory skills & accountability
- Enhance organizational climate – caring community
 - Emphasize fairness & respect
 - Effective communication
 - People rewarded, supported, and held accountable
 - Prevention & early intervention with inappropriate behaviors
 - Build engagement for mutual safety & well-being

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MANAGE PRECIPITATING EVENTS

- Minimize unnecessary precipitants where possible
- Consider impact of timing and location of interventions
- Monitor & plan for Loss / Injustice
- Monitor & plan for Key dates / events
- Monitor for reactions to administrative/court actions
- Monitor reactions to case management/interventions


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IMPLEMENT, MONITOR, FOLLOW UP

- Once the plan is developed, it needs to be implemented and monitored.
 - Active monitoring – seek out information
 - Passive monitoring – dependent on further reports
- Further interventions or referrals may be necessary.
- Continue to follow up as necessary.
- Close the case once threat priority/status has been reduced to acceptable level.

SIGMA



WHAT RULES MAY APPLY?

- Federal & State Privacy Laws
- Federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act
- State public accommodations laws / disability-related employment laws
- Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA")
- State Patient-Health Care Professional Privileges
- Freedom of Information / Open Records Laws
- Institutional Policies

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POLICIES TO SUPPORT THE PROCESS

Policies with TAM-related implications:

- Workplace violence prevention
- Threat assessment & management
- Harassment & discrimination
- Crisis management
- Employee discipline
- Interim suspension
- Fitness for duty
- Direct threat evaluations
- Weapons
- Bomb threat

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The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States (2002)

Joint Project of the:

- US Secret Service
- US Department of Education

Source: *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States* by Bryan Vossekuil, Robert A. Fein, Ph.D., Marisa Reddy, Ph.D., Randy Borum, Psy.D., & William Modzeleski (2002).

Available at:
www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_finalreport.pdf




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Workplace Violence: Issues in Response. (2004)

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation



Available at:
www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence


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Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence: Considerations for Assessment the Risk of Future Violent Behavior (2006)

Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP)
www.atapworldwide.org

Available at:
downloads.workplaceviolencenews.com/rage-v.pdf



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Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education (2010)

Joint Project of the:

- US Secret Service
- US Department of Education
- Federal Bureau of Investigation

Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, & Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*.

Available at:
www.ilis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/campus-attacks.pdf



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Protecting the Force: Lessons From Fort Hood (2010)


Report of the DoD Independent Review

Recommendation 3.2

Provide commanders with a multidisciplinary capability, based on best practices such as the Navy's Threat Management Unit ... focused on predicting and preventing insider attacks.

- Page 28

Available at:
www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13Jan10.pdf



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INFORMED BY RESEARCH & PRACTICE

A Risk Analysis Standard for Natural and Man-Made Hazards to Higher Education Institutions (2010)

ASME Innovative Technologies Institute

- Approved by American National Standards Institute
- Recommends: "that Threat Assessment Teams be put into place on campus to help identify potential persons of concern and gather and analyze information regarding the potential threat posed by an individual(s)"
- Courts have allowed testimony that ANSI standards inform standard of care.
- Available at: www.asme.org/products/books/a-risk-analysis-standard-for-natural-and-man-made-

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ANSI RECOMMENDED RESOURCES

Available for purchase at:
www.tsgsinc.com

Free download at:
www.threatassessment.vt.edu

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Enforcement Procedures for Investigating or Inspecting Workplace Violence Incidents (2011)

U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration

Guidelines for OSHA Investigators

Available at:
www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-01-052.pdf

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Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention American National Standard (2011)

Society for Human Resource Management & ASIS International

Available at:
www.abdi-secure-e-commerce.com/asis/ps-1092-30-1967.aspx

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INFORMED BY RESEARCH & PRACTICE

Task Force Report: Predicting Violent Behavior (2012)

Department of Defense; Defense Science Board

1.8 Recommended Strategy

- Provide effective intervention capabilities throughout DoD using a threat management approach.
 - Increase likelihood of early detection and warning of problems to commanders, supervisors, co-workers with improved information sharing and knowledge.
 - Enhance awareness of the risk of targeted violence throughout DoD.

Available at:
www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/PredictingViolentBehavior.pdf

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Available at:
rems.ed.gov/EOPGuides
Released: 6/18/13

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A review of current research, threat assessment literature, and active shooting incidents, combined with the extensive case experience of the Behavioral Analysis Unit, suggests that there are observable pre-attack behaviors that, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack. ¹² (Page 15)

¹² ... Deisinger, Gene, et al. *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams*. Stoneham, MA: Applied Risk Management. 2008.

Available at:
<http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/Documents/active-shooter-planning-eop2014.pdf>
Released: December 2014

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International Handbook of Threat Assessment (2014)

Edited by:
J. Reid Meloy &
Jens Hoffmann

Available at:
www.oup.com/us

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INFORMED BY RESEARCH & PRACTICE

Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing & Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks (2017)

US Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Behavioral Analysis Unit

Available at: <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf>

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CHALLENGES

Communication and Coordination is Critical!

- Multiple processes that manage cases:
 - Threat Assessment
 - Sexual Harassment
 - Domestic Violence
 - Insider Threat
 - Dignitary Protection
- Mind the Gap!
 - Clarify mission/roles
 - Shared membership
 - Regular communication
 - Integrated planning
 - Designated authority and responsibility

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WHEN YOUR ONLY TOOL IS A HAMMER. . .

Over-Reliance on Control-Based Strategies

- Discipline
- Suspension
- Administrative orders
- Court orders
- Criminal prosecution
- Termination

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Never equate separation with safety

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CHALLENGES

Prepare for re-integration of subject:

- Evaluate subject readiness to safely and effectively participate in experience
- Coach subject of concern about re-entry
- Anticipate environmental aspects which subject of concern may encounter
- Develop proactive case management plan
- Monitor & Re-assess
- Intervene as appropriate

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CONTAGION EFFECT

Time Between Mass Shootings, 1982-2014

Data analysis by Harvard School of Public Health
Mother Jones

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GROWING/FUTURE CHALLENGES

Increased Complexity due to:

- Strategic partnerships / collaborations
- Remote business
- Globalization

Challenges:

- Identifying threats
 - Distance
 - Limited contact/engagement
- Capacity and authority to address concerns
- Duty to warn/protect
- Monitoring

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GROWING/FUTURE CHALLENGES

Lone Actor Terrorism / Violent Extremism

- Domestic & international influence
- Social media / contagion effect
- Modify tactics
- Targets of availability

Considerations:

- Community engagement
- Collaboration & partnership
- Full Emergency Preparedness



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